Adverse possession –did the clock stop during the pandemic?
The High Court’s decision in CV 2021‑01098 Seenath & ors v Ramlakhan & anor delivered on 8 April 2025, at first glance reads like a straightforward landlord‑and‑tenant/adverse‑possession contest. Yet paragraphs 55–56 of the Honourable Westmin J’s judgment contain a thought‑provoking obiter dicta that may give both landowners and occupiers pause. Justice Westmin James noted that the COVID‑19 pandemic effectively shut the doors of the courts for a considerable time. While the Limitation of Certain Actions Act was formally suspended by ministerial orders, no similar orders were made in relation to claims under the Real Property Limitation Act. His Lordship suggested that “the common law should evolve” so that the running of limitation periods for adverse‑possession claims is likewise suspended when litigants are legally barred from bringing an action. Although strictly obiter—and therefore not binding—this comment signals judicial sympathy for arguments that pandemic‑era delays ought not to prejudice a paper‑title holder. Future defendants relying on adverse possession may now face the added hurdle of establishing that time continued to run uninterrupted between March 2020 and May 2022, despite widespread court closures. Conversely, claimants may be emboldened to plead a pandemic “stop‑clock” even in the absence of express statutory authority. The discussion in paragraphs 55–56 carries several broader implications. Parties whose 16‑year limitation period under the Real Property Limitation Act happened to straddle the pandemic may now argue—drawing on Justice James’s comments—that the clock should be regarded as paused during the months when lockdowns effectively closed the courts. For litigators, the dicta invites a more cautious approach to pleadings and a renewed emphasis on documenting the practical hurdles to commencing or serving proceedings between 2020 and 2022. At a policy level, the judgment exposes a legislative gap: while emergency regulations extended limitation periods for many civil claims, property disputes under the RPLA were left untouched, prompting questions about whether a targeted statutory amendment is now overdue. Caveat: These reflections and statements from the Judge remain persuasive at best, no more than a marker of where the common law could go. For now, the statutory position under the RPLA still governs, with the period being 16 years to establish adverse possession.
AI in the courtroom: a timely reminder for the Caribbean bar
AI in the courtroom: a timely reminder for the Caribbean Bar The judgment on 30th April 2025 in CV2023-04039 Nexgen Pathology Services Ltd v Darceuil Duncan is already sparking debate across the legal profession. In a trenchant passage, James J condemned the reliance on “non-existent” authorities—apparently drawn from an unchecked AI search—and stressed that “irresponsible use of internet sources or generative AI tools undermines not only individual cases but also the credibility of the legal system as a whole.” This judgment is a timely reminder that while generative AI can sharpen our research pencils, it can just as easily ink in “hallucinations”. The Court condemned the citing of non-existent authorities that appear to have been lifted wholesale from an unverified AI search, and has referred the matter to the Disciplinary Committee under s 37(2) of the Legal Profession Act. The decision lands barely two months after the Caribbean Court of Justice issued Practice Direction No. 1 of 2025 on the Use of Generative AI. The CCJ expressly prohibits AI-generated content in affidavits and witness statements and reminds practitioners that every citation must be independently verified. It also empowers courts to demand disclosure of any AI assistance and to impose costs sanctions for non-compliance. Together, these developments mark a watershed for the Caribbean bar: AI can enhance speed and insight, but only when tempered by rigorous human oversight and ethical safeguards. Pollonais, Blanc, de la Bastide & Jacelon advocates the use of legal-tech innovation, but never at the expense of professional integrity. We remind all fellow practitioners that while we as a profession embrace training, to ensure attention is placed on governance so that use of generative AI augments, rather than erodes, the high standards on which our clients and the Courts rely. The future of law is intelligent; but, as the Nexgen judgment reminds us, it must never be blindly artificial.
Privy Council to decide on legality of levy for local Motor Insurance Bureau
Privy Council to decide on legality of levy for local Motor Insurance Bureau The Court of Appeal’s order of 25 April 2025 granting conditional leave for the Motor Insurance Bureau Association (MIBA) to take its ongoing dispute with the State to the Privy Council has thrown a long-simmering issue back into the national spotlight. At the heart of the case lies more than TT $1 billion in levies collected from motorists since 2008—money explicitly earmarked to fund a Motor Insurance Bureau (MIB) that has never been created. The MIB model is anything but novel. In 1946, the United Kingdom’s insurers entered into an agreement with the government that established the Motor Insurers’ Bureau to compensate people injured by drivers who carried no insurance or fled the scene.Trinidad & Tobago formally embraced the same idea in the 2008 Budget, introducing a levy on motor-insurance premiums to capitalize a local MIB. The levy was duly collected— and according to the pleadings in the aforementioned case, has amassed over a billion dollars by 2017—but the institutional machinery to pay claims was never enacted. In 2017 the MIBA and a private citizen sought judicial review, arguing that the continued collection and retention of the levy without establishing the Bureau was unlawful. Both the High Court and, in 2024, the Court of Appeal held that policy statements alone cannot create a legal duty; only Parliament can establish the MIB and authorize payouts. The leave now granted to appeal to the Privy Council offers one last judicial avenue to compel action—or at least provide clarity—on the status of the fund. If the Privy Council rules in favor of the Motor Insurance Bureau Association, the government may be compelled to take swift action, either by enacting the legislation to begin disbursing the funds to claimants, or by halting the collection of the levy (which has largely already stopped). On the other hand, if the Privy Council upholds the lower courts’ decisions, the issue will squarely return to the realm of policy. Regardless of the judicial outcome, the need for a functioning Motor Insurance Bureau in Trinidad & Tobago remains evident. The status quo leaves too many road users vulnerable and undermines the mischief that statutorily-required motor insurance represents. Victims of uninsured motorists remain in a precarious position: they could sue the driver, but any judgment is worth little against an impecunious defendant, and hit-and-run victims have no practical remedy at all. Bringing Trinidad & Tobago’s MIB to life would align our country with well-established international practices that safeguard road victims. At Pollonais, Blanc, de la Bastide & Jacelon, we will be closely following the developments of this case and any legislative changes that might ensue. Follow our page for updates when the Privy Council lists the hearing and hands down judgment.
